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Legal Justice or Social Justice?
Debating the Rule of Law in Tannaitic Literature
Chaya Halberstam (King’s University College)
This article aims to read closely the tannaitic material pertaining to judicial discretion and legal 
justice with the understanding that the rabbis are not simply clarifying certain specialized ques-
tions about courtroom procedure but are seriously engaging a core facet of Roman imperial and 
Hellenistic ideology: the benefits and deficits of the rule of law. It has been noted that as opposed 
to later, talmudic rabbis, the Tanaaim are particularly strict with regard to personal, judicial 
discretion – in other words, that rather than strike a balance between law and wisdom, they 
allow only for rule-based decision making. This article suggests that the Tanaaim not only opt 
for rule-bound decision making, but that they do so with a full awareness of what is lost from 
broader ideals of social justice when judges are required to abide, almost mechanically, by the 
rules. The Tanaaim thereby contributed to contemporary questions in political philosophy from 
the point of view of disempowered Roman provincials for whom the rule of law meant less as 
political propaganda and more as a measure of stability in uncertain times.
Early rabbinic texts on judges and judging stand at an interesting cultural 
crossroads. On the one hand, deferring continually to biblical texts in which 
judging is an act of wisdom and inspiration,1 tannaitic texts envision judges 
similarly endowed with humility and virtue: rather than anxiety about corrupt 
judges, we find far more concern in tannaitic texts with the way well-meaning 
judges can be led astray.2 On the other hand, tannaitic texts about judging, 
both in form and content, thoroughly reflect the “rule of law” ideology that 
was the hallmark of the Roman and Greek worlds, and an integral component 
of Hellenistic Jewish literature.3 Namely, the rabbis imagine judges applying 
rabbinic law in dispute resolution, as they themselves interpret and apply bib-
lical law to questions of proper judicial procedure. Did the early rabbis thus 
discard the traditional, Torah ideal, exemplified by King Solomon, that a judge 
could attend closely to the particular circumstances of each litigant and rule 
from a place of wisdom, compassion, and inspiration? Did they instead opt for 
the thoroughly Roman notion that “a populus” must be “united by … consen-
sual commitment to a particular normative order,” as Cicero put it?4
In a sense, the answer is yes, but to assume this answer – to approach tan-
naitic rules of judging as already part of a rational, “normative order”  – is 
1 See J. Burnside, God, Justice, and Society: Aspects of Law and Legality in the Bible (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 103–44.
2 See below.
3 See M. LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah: The Re-Characterization of Israel’s Written 
Law (New York: T & T Clark, 2006), chapter 5.
4 As quoted in C. Ando, Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire (Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 2000), 48.
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to beg the question.5 I would like to suggest in what follows that tannaitic 
literature records a debate, when it talks about judging,6 about this broader 
question of the relationship between strict adherence to law and broader aims 
of justice. It is my contention that in debating the limits of judicial discretion 
for judges, the rabbis are indeed engaging, at times directly and at times inci-
dentally, this central, political-philosophical question of the value of the rule 
of law and its limits.7 We may thus understand the Tanaaim as constructing 
an understanding of law as a disembodied system of rules and precedent – 
a normative order  – rather than proceeding from a presumption that legal 
discourse must be so. That the Tanaaim do construct law in this way may be 
seen as arising from a particular historical context rather than standing as an 
inevitable or necessary conclusion.
Therefore, this article aims to read closely the tannaitic material pertaining 
to judicial discretion and legal justice8 with the understanding that the rab-
bis are not simply clarifying certain specialized questions about courtroom 
5 Aaron Kirschenbaum, in his book on this topic, makes this assumption from the first page 
onward: “The law’s generality and rigid impartiality make for constancy and order in human 
society. Adherence to formalism is a characteristic of the law necessary for its internal integrity 
and proper functioning.” See A. Kirschenbaum, Equity in Jewish Law: Halakhic Perspectives in 
Law: Formalism and Flexibility in Jewish Civil Law (Hobokon, N. J.: Ktav Publishing House, 
1991), 3. He goes on to show that ideas akin to Aristotle’s “equity” have central roles in rabbinic 
texts about judicial procedure. Regardless, while his work is an important treatment of these 
questions, it approaches all of Jewish law as a single, holistic system, and thus his conclusions 
are not particularly relevant for this study of just the tannaitic era of rabbinic literature.
6 The connection between individual instances of judgment – and the role of the judge – as 
pivotal in the notion of the rule of law is delineated clearly by Judith Shklar in assessing 
Aristotle’s understanding of the concept: “In Aristotle’s account the single most important 
condition for the Rule of Law is the character one must impute to those who make legal judg-
ments.” See J. N. Shklar and S. Hoffmann, Political Thought and Political Thinkers (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998): 23.
7 Ari Bryen, in a recent article entitled “When Law Goes Off the Rails, Or, Aggadah Among 
the Iurisprudentes,” Critical Analysis of Law 3.1 (2016): 9–29, makes a similar methodologi-
cal claim about the writing of Roman jurists that I think applies equally to the tannaitic 
rabbis. He writes:
 The Romans never developed an analytical vocabulary for talking about law itself, or issues 
of law’s legitimacy: both of these kinds of inquiries were just parts of a broader discussion 
of ius, and even then, they remained quite undeveloped in the early Empire (c. AD 1–250), 
a historical period not given to sophisticated political theorizing. What attempts there were 
often feel like inchoate rumbles, as authors push against generic constraints. (12–13)
 Bryen borrows the term “aggadah” from scholarship on the Talmud to refer to these texts, 
which confuses the issue somewhat when trying to bring this type of thinking back to rab-
binics. Nevertheless, I similarly endeavour to locate moments within a broader rabbinic 
“discussion of ius” which push against dominant modes of rabbinic, legal thought, in obvi-
ous and more subtle ways.
8 Throughout this article, I use the phrase “legal justice” to mean a narrow type of justice, 
rather than “justice” broadly conceived: “legal justice” is what results when people are treat-
ed according to what the law dictates. For a fuller explanation see D. J. Luban, “Justice and 
Law” in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (eds. N. J. Smelser and 
P. B. Baltes; Oxford: Pergamon, 2001): 8042–48.
Journal of Ancient Judaism, 7. Jg., 397–422, ISSN: 1869-3296 (print), 2196-7954 (online) 
© 2016 [2017] Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen
Legal Justice or Social Justice? 399
procedure but are seriously engaging a core facet of Roman imperial and Hel-
lenistic ideology: the benefits and deficits of the rule of law. It has been noted 
that as opposed to later, talmudic rabbis, the Tanaaim are particularly strict 
with regard to personal, judicial discretion – in other words, that rather than 
strike a balance between law and wisdom, they allow only for rule-based deci-
sion making.9 What I would like to suggest in the pages that follow, then, is 
not simply that the Tanaaim seem to opt for rule-bound decision making, but 
that they did so with their eyes open – in other words, with a full awareness 
of what is lost from broader ideals of social justice10 when judges are required 
to abide, almost mechanically, by the rules. The Tanaaim thereby contributed 
to contemporary questions in political philosophy from the point of view of 
disempowered Roman provincials for whom the rule of law meant less as po-
litical propaganda and more as a measure of stability in uncertain times.
Awareness of the Limits of Legal Justice:  
Legal Judgment vs Mediation in the Tosefta
The primary witness to the tannaitic awareness of the limits of rule of law 
ideology occurs in the first chapter of Tosefta Sanhedrin in the form of a dis-
pute over whether rule-bound, legal justice ought to be preferred to alternative 
forms of dispute resolution. Approximately a full half of the first chapter of 
Tosefta Sanhedrin deals with the question of why and whether legal justice is 
a virtue. The opinion in favour of strict, rule-bound decision making sees it 
as aligned with absolute, divine truth – a value which they believe ought not 
be undermined, even as it can be supplemented by other acts of benevolence. 
The opinion which prefers mediated compromise to strict legal justice does 
not seem to value legal reasoning for its own sake, but rather chiefly as it can 
serve broader interests of social justice.11 By homing in on the role of the judge 
9 See H. Ben-Menahem, Judicial Deviation in Talmudic Law: Governed by Men, Not by Rules 
(New York: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1991), 121–22.
10 I use “social justice” here in a broad sense, perhaps along the lines of Peter Brown’s “aesthet-
ics” of society, i. e., considerations of “what constituted a good society and what constituted 
an ugly society” (P. Brown, “Remembering the Poor and the Aesthetic of Society,” in Jour-
nal of Interdisciplinary History 35.3 [2005]: 513–22, 514). Because the rabbis’ considerations 
primarily revolve around basic inequalities, the term “social justice” seems more appropri-
ate to me here.
11 The broader concerns that I have roughly termed “social justice” are here represented in 
several ways: the duty to foster harmonious community relations even among disputants, 
the requirement of providing a livelihood for the poor, and the protection of the vulnerable 
from the strong and powerful. Even though it is the main subject of this article, the Ta-
naaim do not actually have a word for “justice,” even though the biblical term tsedeq is cited 
and interpreted in tannaitic midrash. A. Radzyner explains that the Tanaaim actually had 
two different concepts of justice, depending on the situation: for monetary law, justice = le-
gal truth, and for criminal law, justice = viewing the defendant favourably. See A. Radzyner, 
“‘Justice, Justice Shall You Pursue’: Varied Concepts of Judicial Justice in Tannaitic Doc-
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in adjudicating disputes, the Tosefta here puts the “rule of law” philosophy to 
the test: is sustaining an independent, rational system of legal thought a good 
in its own right, or must it simply be a means to a just end?12
The Tosefta first advances the notion that only strict legal justice is godly, 
while mediated compromise transgresses God’s will:
Just as judgment is done before three judges, so also compromise13 is with three. Once 
the verdict is reached one is not allowed to compromise.
 R. Eleazar b. R Jose the Galilean, says: whoever compromises, that one transgresses. 
And whoever praises one who compromises, that one blasphemes before God. About 
this it is said: “one who blesses a botse’a, insults the Lord” [Ps 10:3].14 Rather, let the law 
trine” in My Justice, Your Justice: Justice Across Cultures (ed. Y. Z. Stern; Jerusalem: The Zal-
man Shazar Center for Jewish History, 2010), 59–110 [Hebrew]. He also argues that they did 
not align the concept of compromise, or pesharah, with tsedeq and therefore did not see it as 
a kind of justice (Radzyner, ibid., 105–09). The evidence as Radzyner presents it, however, 
points to the Tanaaim as essentially aligning the word tsedeq with particular types of proce-
dural justice. Here, I wish to discuss their understanding of “justice” in the broader sense in 
which it is commonly used as a rubric by which to measure a society. This idea of “justice” 
varies from culture to culture; it might include distributive justice, equality of opportunity, 
freedom from arbitrary violence, etc. I use “justice” or “social justice” throughout this ar-
ticle not as a precise term, but as a heuristic one that signals a multifaceted array of social 
values that the Tanaaim themselves invoke.
12 Haim Shapira frames the dispute in a somewhat different way, seeing it as an argument 
between two different visions of justice, corrective vs distributive, in his article “The Debate 
Over Compromise and the Goals of the Judicial Process,” Dine Israel 26–27 (2010): 183–
228, 223–26. I follow Christine Hayes however in seeing the debate as a conflict between 
(what is understood to be) truth and other ideals which include justice, however rendered. 
See C. Hayes, What’s Divine about Divine Law? Early Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2015), 185–86.
13 I have translated the word pesharah here as compromise instead of the more usual “arbitra-
tion” because there is far too much ambiguity surrounding the legal process understood as 
arbitration for it to be a meaningful word. For example, arbitration can refer to any kind 
of dispute resolution done outside a formal courtroom without any reference as to method. 
It seems clear from various rabbinic texts that pesharah here specifically refers to a kind 
of mediated settlement in which there is no clear winner on either side – either funds are 
distributed or an otherwise middle-of-the-road solution is found. Hence, the English word 
“compromise” seems most suitable. See I. Lipschits, “The Meaning of P’shara,” Alei Mish-
pat: The Law Review of the Academic Center of Law & Business 8 (2010): 395–426 [Hebrew]; 
especially pp. 423–25. In addition, I am persuaded by Lipschits that the terms pesharah 
and bitsu’a are used synonymously in the Tosefta and later rabbinic texts, even if they have 
distinct origins. See ibid., 420–23.
14 The root b-ts-‘ in biblical Hebrew denotes profiting or gaining advantage, and the root b-
r-kh, when used with a divine object, is most often a euphemistic use of “bless” to actually 
mean “curse.” The first part of the verse in Psalms reads: “The wicked boasts of the desires 
of his heart,” and so this half-verse in Psalms most likely means something like “and he who 
seeks profit curses and insults the Lord.” (Or, as per the NRSV, “those greedy for gain curse 
and renounce the Lord.”) The poetic verse has a chiastic structure: (A) The wicked [boasts 
of his] (B) selfish desires // (B) those seeking profit (A) curse and insult the Lord. The rabbis 
read the verb b-ts-‘ in Mishnaic Hebrew as someone who compromises or facilitates a com-
promise, and then they read the verb “bless” plainly instead of euphemistically. Hence they 
arrive at the reading: whoever blesses someone who compromises insults the Lord.
Journal of Ancient Judaism, 7. Jg., 397–422, ISSN: 1869-3296 (print), 2196-7954 (online) 
© 2016 [2017] Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen
Legal Justice or Social Justice? 401
[ha-din] pierce the mountain, as Moses said, let the law [ha-din] pierce the mountain.15 
But Aaron pursued peace between fellow men, as it is said, “he walked with me in 
peace and uprightness,” [Mal 2:6] etc.16
 Rabbi Eliezer b. Jacob says: why does scripture say, “one who blesses a botse’a, in-
sults the Lord”? They related a parable: To what may the matter be compared? To one 
who stole a se’ah of wheat, ground it, baked it, separated the dough-offering from it, 
and fed it to his children. How can he recite a blessing? He does not bless, but blas-
phemes. And about this it is said: “a botse’a who blesses, insults the Lord.”17 (t. Sanh. 
1:2; Zuckermandel p. 415)18
The opinion that upholds strict legal judgment as the only valid form of dis-
pute resolution is shared by R. Eleazar b. R. Jose the Galilean and R. Eliezer 
b. Jacob. For them, God is equated with substantive truth, and to veer from 
that is to reject God implicitly. For R. Eleazar, law has the power to pierce 
through any resistance, and it must be used to do so, regardless of the conse-
quences. To effect a compromise which, by definition, means that each party 
has agreed to the outcome, is equated with theft by R. Eliezer. Finally, ac-
cording to R. Eleazar, anyone who even praises those engaged in compromise 
is likened to one guilty of what in the biblical and rabbinic world view was 
viewed as a capital crime, blasphemy.
The rhetoric in this Tosefta advocates for a strictly formal approach to ad-
judication: any deviation from the ostensibly determinate requirements of 
the application of the law, even to the parties’ satisfaction, is a perversion of 
justice, rather than a fulfillment of it. The first supporting text about Moses 
upholding the law includes a passage that suggests that law is not enough to 
sustain a community, by informing us that Moses’ brother and priestly coun-
terpart Aaron assiduously pursues peace while Moses pursues the law.19 If that 
is the case, the passage concedes that if legal truth is aggressively pursued, it 
may need to be complemented by other social practices that can restore har-
mony to the community.
15 There is no verse citation here, which is unusual, especially as these words are placed into the 
mouth of Moses. Commentators have linked this idea with Moses adjudication in the wilder-
ness (see Exod 18:16), or Moses’ exhortation that judges not be afraid of making difficult deci-
sions (Deut 1:17). See I. Lifshitz, Compromise in Jewish Law (Ph. D. diss., Bar Ilan University, 
2004), 76 n. 48 [Hebrew] for a fuller explanation of the phrase and its connection to Moses.
16 Conveniently, this midrash leaves off the first part of the verse in Malachi, which reads: 
‘True instruction was in his mouth, and no wrong was found on his lips.” This sounds a lot 
more like the pursuit of truth rather than compromise and peace.
17 The verse is read differently, here. The rabbis shift the subject and object around in order to 
produce the reading they desire. In the previous interpretation, the botse’a is the object; the 
subject is the implied third person pronoun of the verb “[one] blesses.” Here, the parable 
implies that it is the botse’a who recites the blessing, placing it as the subject of the verb: “the 
botse’a who blesses insults the Lord.”
18 Translations are my own.
19 Perhaps the redactor brings this text in order to suggest that “peace” is somebody else’s 
problem: leave that to others, not the judges or the jurists. According to Rashi (b. Sanh. 6a), 
Aaron’s activity firmly takes place outside the court, before the trial.
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The second supporting text is a parable that works best if one has a formalist 
notion of theft as an absolute evil; if one approaches the parable from a social 
justice perspective in which theft might be a response of the desperate and 
needy to gross social inequalities, the parable unravels. Thus, the narrative 
constructed to serve the ends of strict legalism20 opens itself up to alternative 
readings: read against the grain, it raises the question of why a man so careful 
to separate the dough offering and recite a blessing, who uses the one loaf he 
bakes not for personal gain but to feed his children, would steal a se’ah of grain 
to begin with? Was the man hungry, poor, and desperate? Did he mistake 
owned grain for ownerless sheaves? Is he an angry tenant-farmer being under-
paid by his overlords and thus stole grain in revenge? The decisive, concluding 
“moral” of this parable deems none of these particular elements of the story 
relevant, and asks us to see the theft as an absolute wrong. But the narrative of 
the parable plausibly undercuts the necessity of this decisive verdict: it is not 
clear at all, to the reader, that the man in the parable blasphemes the creator. 
Only a very narrow rendering of justice would see no room for anything but 
condemnation.
A more expansive idea of justice appears to motivate the next comment in 
the Tosefta, which opposes the preeminence of strict, legal justice:
Another Interpretation: “one who blesses a botse’a, insults the Lord.” These are the 
brothers of Joseph, who said: “what profit do we gain if we kill our brother?” [Gen 37:26].
 R. Joshua b Qorha said: it is a commandment to compromise. As it is said: “truth, 
and judgments of peace [mishpat shalom], shall you judge in your gates”21 (Zech 8:16). 
And is it not the case that in every place where there is true judgment [mishpat ’emet] 
there is no peace? And in every place that there is peace there is no true judgment 
[mishpat ’emet]? Where do we find [true]22 judgment [mishpat ’emet] wherein one finds 
peace? One must say: this is compromise.23
 And thus it says with regard to David “and David administered justice [mishpat 
u’tsedaqa] among all his people” (2 Sam 8:16). And is it not the case that in every place 
where there is legal justice [mishpat] there is no [tsedaqa] charity? And every place 
that there is charity [tsedaqa] there is no legal justice [mishpat]? One must say: this is 
compromise. (t. Sanh. 1:3; Zuckermandel p. 415)
20 Contra Shapira, “The Debate Over Compromise,” 211, I see this passage as having a concep-
tual – and not just associative – link with the debate about compromise vs legal justice.
21 I have attempted to render this half-verse as literally as possible. The NRSV translates: “ren-
der in your gates judgments that are true and make for peace”; JPS has: “render true and 
perfect justice in your gates.” There is quite a bit of leeway in understanding these terms, 
which I will discuss below.
22 Some Mss have this word and some do not. See Radzyner, “‘Justice, Justice Shall You Pur-
sue,’” 98 n. 137. The presence or absence of the word ’emet here does not really affect the 
discussion here, as in any case the word mishpat here would connote a limited idea of legal 
justice.
23 A parallel text appears in in Sifre Deuteronomy pisqa 17, with both opinions on compromise 
also represented.
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This tosefta preserves the dichotomy between mishpat (here perhaps best ren-
dered as “legal justice”) and peace or charity, seeing them as essentially sepa-
rate social or institutional spheres. Nevertheless, it sees in the act of mediated 
compromise a true combination of both values rather than an upholding of 
one at the expense of the other.
The first pericope simply renders inert the verse that was used in the previ-
ous tosefta to impute a negative valence to the compromiser by severing the 
link between the term botse’a in Psalms 10 and the mishnaic Hebrew bitsu’a 
meaning compromise. They link the verb to its use in Genesis 37, in the con-
text of Joseph’s brothers, in which the root b-ts-‘ refers to ill-gotten gain; they 
remark that the botse’a of the verse in Psalms that creates the parallel to the 
blasphemer refers not to a general category of people who negotiate compro-
mises but specifically to Joseph’s brothers; those who praise Joseph’s brothers 
insult the Lord by extolling those who profited off the sale of their own flesh 
and blood.24 There is an element of “compromise” in this case, in which those 
brothers’ who wanted to kill Joseph settle for merely selling him to the Ishma-
elites, as Judah proposes. But the point is that in this case, the compromise is 
not just, but an attempt to profit off injury to an innocent party. And in this 
specific case (or perhaps this class of cases), bets’a does in fact insult the Lord.
But the tosefta continues: not only is compromise not blasphemous, it is 
actually a divine commandment. The way the tosefta derives this command-
ment is by constructing compromise as a kind of juridical practice that unites 
the values of legal justice with peace or charity – two other important ideals in 
a larger vision of social justice. Strict adherence legal justice neglects the full 
gamut of social needs, the tosefta argues, and dispute resolution via mediated 
compromise allows the judge(s) to hear the concerns of the claimants and ad-
dress them not only via strict legal reasoning but also by encouraging generos-
ity and a spirit of good will. In this type of dispute resolution, it is important 
not only to reach a conclusion, but to end the court proceedings with both 
litigants feeling relatively satisfied.25
The tosefta makes this point in two very similar pericopes, each of which 
makes the claim that a society (“place”) that only values one side of the legal 
justice / peace-and-generosity divide will not actually be a place that fulfills 
the ideals of social justice. As we shall see below, tannaitic literature for the 
most part upholds the notion of the rule of law as a means of reining in arbi-
trary violence and fulfilling the words of the Torah, but in this tosefta we see 
an acknowledgment that the rule of law in a strict sense leads to social discord 
24 There is, perhaps, a slightly subtler argument here in that the motive of profiting of the sale 
of Joseph in fact prevents a greater harm, which is his murder. Nevertheless, the midrashic 
reading of this verse here insists that praising this action is insulting to God.
25 Contemporary legal practice that prioritizes similar values is usually referred to as “re-
storative justice.” See E. Segal, “Jewish Perspectives on Restorative Justice,” in The Spiri-
tual Roots of Restorative Justice (ed. M. Hadley; Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York 
Press, 2001) 193–94.
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and a pervasive attitude of parsimony both of which are here rejected as com-
munal ideals.
The only difference between the two passages is the biblical verse cited and 
the resulting noun serving as the counterweight to legal judgment. The first, 
“shalom,” peace, merely addresses the discord that results from an antagonis-
tic trial and a verdict that declares one litigant the winner and one the loser. 
The authors of this midrash seem to know all too well that this kind of legal 
process, far from bringing an end to strife, all too often allows it to inten-
sify. In the second passage, the term shifts from “shalom” to “tsedaqa,” a word 
which rather consistently in rabbinic dialect means charity or almsgiving, 
even though it has a much more expansive meaning in its earlier history.26 In 
this case, the word “tsedaqa” must be taken more expansively not just as a ma-
terial gift to the poor but as a charitable or generous act in general. This seems 
clear both from the context in this passage, in which we have no mention of 
wealth disparity or impoverishment, as well as from the context of Tosefta 
Sanhedrin 1:5 (cited below) in which the act of “tsedaqa” is understood as a 
“charitable” removal of property from the one who is holding it. Compromise 
or mediation, in place of strict legal judgment, is thus seen not only as a means 
to prevent ongoing feuding, but also as a means of ensuring that members of 
the community act generously and charitably toward one another rather than 
insisting on the full measure of their rightful entitlements.27 This tosefta thus 
explicitly posits a “golden mean” between strict “rule of law” practice on the 
one hand, and an ethic of care unchecked by legal justice on the other – one 
that fosters a caring community and promotes a rich, comprehensive idea of 
social justice.
In the next two passages in the Tosefta, the defenders of legal justice take 
up the theme of tsedaqa, demonstrating how that value may be upheld even 
without recourse to compromise. Two different perspectives are presented. 
Neither rejects tsedaqa, as both see generosity as a central value, but each sees 
its relationship to legal justice differently:
If one rendered a verdict, clearing the one in the right and declaring liable the one who 
is liable – if one declared a poor personal liable, he takes out his own funds and gives 
them to him. We find that he does an act of charity [tsedaqa] with this one, and he 
judges [dan] this one. (t. Sanh. 1:4; Zuckermandel p. 415)
 Rabbi says: If one rendered a verdict, clearing the one in the right and declaring liable 
the one who is liable – we find that he does an act of charity with the one who is liable, 
since he removes stolen property from his possession, and legal judgment with the one 
in the right as he returns to him that which is his. (t. Sanh. 1:5; Zuckermandel p. 415)
26 See F. Rosenthal, “Sedaqa, Charity,” HUCA 23 (1950–51): 411–30, for the development of 
the term.
27 Other versions of this midrash, seen in the later, Amoraic compilation Genesis Rabbah as 
well as the Babylonian Talmud, do take the word tsedaqa here as almsgiving, and conflate 
this interpretation with the next one in the Tosefta. See Radzyner, “‘Justice, Justice Shall 
You Pursue,’” 98 n. 138.
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While the first opinion does not overtly reject compromise, it proffers from 
the outset a scenario of a completed legal judgment, a verdict rendered. Even 
then, the anonymous opinion states, the ideal of “mishpat u’tsedaqa” (in the 
rabbinic reading: “legal justice and generosity”) can be maintained: if the 
judge declares a poor personal legally liable in a case that requires him to pay 
the other claimant, he may (must?) make up for that loss by giving alms to him 
from his own, personal funds. As a mode of practice, this rule seems unten-
able: if judges had to remunerate all financially disadvantaged claimants they 
ruled against, the burden of social inequity would be lopsidedly placed on 
judges. Moreover, if poor people knew they would receive funds in each and 
every case simply by walking into a courtroom, there would be no disincentive 
to avoid instigating frivolous lawsuits (or, in fact, committing fraud or theft in 
the first place). Instead of a pragmatic policy, the tosefta must instead be read 
as taking a stand on a theoretical issue: the conflict between strict legal justice 
and generosity. The tosefta splits the persona of the judge into two: the judge’s 
“professional” obligation as an adjudicator bound by the rule of law, and his 
personal/social obligation to give charity to the poor. It assumes that charity 
is an important obligation falling upon each member of the community, but 
still insists that it ought not influence the judge’s “professional” assessment 
of the claimants’ legal rights and entitlements. At the same time, just because 
tsedaqa is here siphoned off from the judge’s professional responsibility does 
not necessarily render it as optional: the obligation to give to the poor person 
standing before him may be just as legally binding as the property rights at 
issue in the dispute.28 Theoretically the splitting of responsibilities into profes-
sional and personal – or legal and social – might be an attractive way to solve 
the dilemma of achieving both legal and social justice ideals, but because of 
this system’s high degree of impracticality the dilemma largely remains un-
solved.29
In this passage, we are presented with an act of generosity and an act of legal 
justice as two distinct acts, both performed in relation to the same person: the 
impoverished claimant receives both a legal judgment and a charitable gift, 
both of which are rightfully directed at him or her, but both of which derive 
from two distinct spheres of social practice. In the second passage, Tosefta 
Sanhedrin 1:5, legal justice and generosity are understood as combined in a 
single act, much as an earlier passage suggested about compromise; unlike the 
28 On the obligation to give to the poor in tannaitic literature, see G. Gardner, The Origins of 
Organized Charity in Rabbinic Judaism, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015): 
128–37.
29 The tosefta may be intimating not that every judge needs to literally financially rescue every 
poor claimant whom he rules against, but rather that other social institutions to which the 
the judge is obliged to donate – the tamhuy and the quppa (see Gardner, Organized Charity, 
84–138) – constitute separate social institutions which fulfil “tsedaqa” while the institution 
of the court fulfils “mishpat.” This would be a fair reading of the tosefta, though it departs 
from the plain sense reading of its words, which indicate an act of almsgiving happening in 
the moment after the verdict.
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compromise pericopes, however, the two values are not fused in an expanded 
concept of justice, but still kept wholly distinct. According to this passage, an 
act of generosity is redefined, counter-intuitively understood to pertain to be-
ing declared liable and giving up money or property. The judge’s “generosity” 
is his “generously” saving the litigant from transgressing the law (and God’s 
will?) by benefiting from stolen property. The winner of the case, according to 
this tosefta, receives legal justice rather than generosity, because he or she is 
simply repaid what is rightfully his or hers.
In what sense can being declared liable be seen as an act of charity?30 Here 
we see the absolute adherence to the strict application of statute and prece-
dent – the most maximal rendering of the “rule of law” – thoroughly aligned 
with real, substantive truth and raised to a positive value in and of itself. The 
claim here is that legal judgment inevitably gets it right, and that rightness 
trumps all other values. Does the case before the judge involve someone 
who deliberately stole or defrauded and whose character could be charitably 
shaped by removing the stolen goods as a consequence of bad behaviour? 
Or might this be a case of inheritances or income that for technical reasons 
legally belongs to someone else, even though the claimant sincerely believed 
that it was theirs? In the latter case, it is hard to understand how removing 
it is an act of charity for that person, unless one subscribes to the absolute 
moral correctness of strict allocations of property according to legal logic. 
For the rabbis of this tosefta, behind the law lies its divine author, such that 
fidelity to the law may imply fidelity to God and God’s will for humankind, 
regardless of the earthly effects of those legal judgments. Without a divine 
realm or “religious” sensibility, it is difficult to argue that removing wealth 
which the law has deemed another’s is in any way a charitable act. We have 
seen this stance above, in the opinions of R. Eleazar b. R. Jose the Galilean 
and R. Eliezer b. Jacob on compromise – a stance which understands heav-
enly justice as protecting entitlements in an absolute sense. God is invoked 
by those rabbis to uphold the formal correctness of the law: God is insulted 
or His name blasphemed by evading strict legal judgments; and the law, like 
God himself, can shatter mountains. To make a person right in terms of 
divine law – even if it means impoverishing them – is to make them right 
before their Maker.
The final tosefta found at the end of the chapter does not settle the question 
of whether legal justice or compromise is preferable, but rather concludes each 
side of the argument independently. The adherents of legal justice once again 
invoke the divine sphere, while the proponents of compromise refer only to 
human, judicial procedure:
30 Shapira remarks about this view: “justice is  … determinative, and there is no room for 
tsedaqah in the sense of charity at all” (213). Nevertheless, tsedaqah is used to describe this 
act, and it does not make sense to believe that the rabbis completely uncharacteristically use 
an earlier understanding of the term, such as ‘righteousness.’
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Judges should know whom they judge, before whom they judge, and who judges with 
them …31 as it is said, “both parties to the dispute shall stand before the Lord” (Deut 
19:17); and it says, “God stands in the divine assembly; among the divine beings He 
pronounces judgment” (Ps 82:1); and thus it says with regard to Jehoshaphat: “he said 
to the judges, ‘Consider [lit. “see”] what you are doing, for you judge not on behalf of 
human beings but on the Lord’s behalf ’” (2 Chron 19:6). And if the judge should say 
“why bother with all of this trouble?” is it not already stated: “and [he is] with you in 
giving judgment” [ibid.] – you only have what your eyes see.
R. Simeon b. Gamaliel says: just as legal judgment is with three, so mediated com-
promise is with three. The power of compromise is greater than the power of legal 
judgement, for if two render a legal verdict it may be reversed, but if two mediate a 
compromise it may not be reversed. (t. Sanh. 1:9; Zuckermandel p. 416)
The first half of this tosefta aims to blur thoroughly the lines between hu-
man and divine judgement by first elevating the human judge to the heavenly 
courtroom, and then conversely bringing the divine judge into the earthly 
courtroom. The tosefta follows from a previous pericope (cited below) which 
warned judges and witnesses not to be afraid of the actions or reactions of 
the litigants to undesired judgments, because legal judgment answers to a 
higher calling: divine arbitration of disputes and authority over legal judg-
ments. Tosefta Sanhedrin 1:9 redirects that fear toward God and away from 
earthly concerns. It does so with a three-part exhortation paralleled by three 
verses from Scripture: a judge must know whom he judges  – as Deut 19:17 
spells out, parties to the dispute who stand before God himself as his people; 
before whom he judges – as Ps 82:1 tells us, “divine beings”; and with whom 
he judges – as 2 Chron 19:6 asserts, not men but God. The judge – and indeed 
the entire courtroom  – is thus raised to the level of the heavenly assembly 
described in Ps 82, rendering any legal judgment a sacred task of the utmost 
sanctity and significance. To judge God’s people before God and alongside 
God is not only a kind of imitatio dei, but a channeling of sacred presence to 
participate in a divine activity (“for judgment is God’s”).
Understandably, judges may then seek to withdraw from this highly sancti-
fied and charged process – if they may cower before certain influential men, 
surely they would cower before the Almighty. But the tosefta responds that 
judges should already know how to quiet that anxious voice inside of them. 
Scripture has already said, in the continuation of the quotation from Chroni-
cles above, that God is with you in giving judgment. Inverting the image above 
of the judge partaking in an activity that is rightfully God’s and doing it with 
Him, here God assists in an activity that is quintessentially human and judges 
with you.
31 I have omitted a parallel section here that reiterates the same statement about witnesses, 
which appears (without the adjuration to judges) in the Mishnah. It seems out of place in 
this tosefta which brings verses entirely about judging, but even if it is original, it is not 
pertinent to the discussion here.
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It is here that the image of sight is invoked as the essentially human method 
for arriving at truth and legal judgment, which at first glance appears odd and 
jarring – up until now, in the tosefta, the judge has spent most of the time hear-
ing and knowing rather than seeing. It emerges, I suggest, from the beginning of 
the verse, the word “re’u,” “consider,” but literally translated as “look” or “see.” It 
is as though Scripture is instructing judges not just to think, hear, and consider, 
but to see, and that it is in this act of seeing that God is said to assist the judges. 
I highlight this image because it is in fact consistent with biblical images of cor-
rect and impartial judgment, in which a bribe “blinds the eyes of the wise” (Deut 
16:19), who therefore ought to see clearly when not on the take. It is also consis-
tent with much of this toseftan chapter, which does not assume that a judge is or 
ought to be oblivious to features of the litigants that are readily apparent, such 
as their strength or weakness, their wealth or poverty. A judge must see these 
litigants in all their particularity, and he may even alter his actions on account of 
what he sees (perhaps by recusing himself, or taking personal action apart from 
his professional task as judge). Judges are expected to see and to note difference, 
rather than to blind themselves to these aspects of litigants or “universalize” 
each claim. Nevertheless, the adjustments they can make on account of these 
differences are limited, as they are still expected to adhere to strict standards of 
legal justice. But they are to know that they are supported in their observations 
and legal decisions by God, so that they are not too cowed by either the impulse 
to appease the influential or the anxiety over caring for the vulnerable.
And it is here that the tosefta turns again, and for the last time in this chap-
ter, to the issue of compromise. While this pericope stands alone, stating a rule 
about the number of judges needed for legal judgment and compromise, the 
redactor places it out of its context, and it appears, to me, to be placed here as 
another answer, a “davar aher” to the judge’s question: “why bother with all 
of this trouble”? “The power of compromise is greater than the power of legal 
judgment …” – know, then, that compromise, mediation, is indeed an option 
that remains central in dispute resolution. By placing this pericope at the end 
of the chapter, the redactor takes sides in the argument among Tannaim over 
whether compromise is a commandment or a curse, seeing it as an ideal way 
to restore harmony and settle a dispute without having to sacrifice other es-
sential values or live up to divine standards or judgment. Compromise emerges 
as more just than strict, legal decision making not only because it promotes a 
better and broader vision of justice but also because even when it is less than 
perfect (in this case, adjudicated by less than a full complement of judges), it is 
still effective.
Summary
In this section, we saw that as the tannaitic rabbis debate the question of 
whether legal justice or mediated compromise is a preferable form of dispute 
resolution, they essentially engage a question of political philosophy: what are 
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the limits to the rule of law, and how can they be overcome? The rule of law’s 
limits are identified as existing around the general values of “peace” (com-
munal harmony) and “charity” (a spirit of generosity and material provision 
for the impoverished). The “rule of law” is understood to entail strict legal 
judgment: it may be a reliable mechanism for dispute resolution, but it may 
not result in a just society. Chapter one of Tosefta Sanhedrin provides three 
responses to this question: (1) Legal Justice is Justice – legal justice does not 
need to be supplemented, because ensuring that litigants conform to (divine) 
legal standards is generous and a social good; (2) Legal Justice and Generosity 
are Distinct – both virtues are necessary for a just society, but they are separate 
spheres which must run independently of each other; and (3) Legal Adjudica-
tion can be Generous and Just – mediated compromise is promoted as a dis-
pute resolution mechanism which combines various ideals of social justice.
Awareness of the Limits of Legal Justice:  
Hypotheticals in the Tosefta and Midrash
In the previous section, we saw the ways in which the early rabbis explicitly 
distinguish legal justice (in most cases) from other social goods like peace or 
generosity. In this section, I endeavour to show another way in which the tan-
naitic rabbis display an awareness of the limits of legal justice: the construc-
tion of the hypothetical. The hypothetical, or hava amina,32 is the path not 
taken, the scenario raised by the rabbis that leads us down a false or unsus-
tainable direction and must therefore be rejected. Rabbinic hypotheticals are 
used for a variety of purposes; one purpose they serve is to demonstrate that 
the rabbinic jurists did not act arbitrarily, that they considered all theoretical 
possibilities and had good reasons for making the legal choices they made. 
Thus, in constructing hypothetical alternatives to strict legal justice, the rab-
bis highlight several other modes of judicial decision making, all of which, ac-
cording to Hanina Ben Menahem, use so-called “extra-legal” considerations 
as they “aim at arriving at a fairer and a more just solution to the dispute than 
would otherwise have been reached.”33 These hypotheticals thus depict judges 
who see charity and generosity as integral to justice, or ones that factor emo-
tions such as fear or shame into their judgments. The Tanaaim reject these 
approaches from the outset, but their raising of these possibilities and then 
excluding them constitutes a subtle acknowledgment of what legal justice can 
and cannot achieve.
As we saw above, one of the chief dilemmas the proponents of strict legal 
justice faced was the scenario in which a legal judgment went against a poor 
32 A talmudic phrase indicating an initial assumption or theoretical possibility that is later 
rejected.
33 H. Ben-Menahem, Judicial Deviation in Talmudic Law: Governed by Men, Not by Rules, 
(New York: Harwood, 1991), 120.
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person and in favour of a wealthy one; such a scenario flew in the face of a 
rabbinic commitment to almsgiving and maintaining the poor. The rabbinic 
commentators therefore struggled with a difficult, and somewhat problematic, 
biblical commandment, which states that legal justice is supposed to be indif-
ferent to a litigant’s financial plight: “we-dal lo’ tehedar beribo” (Exod 23:3). 
A literal translation of this phrase would read something like “you shall not 
honour the poor [man] in his lawsuit”; the root h-d-r is used throughout the 
Hebrew Bible and contemporaneous literature in relation to the great and 
mighty, indeed even YHWH himself,34 and it is unusual to have it here used 
with the poor man as its object – so much so that the BHS critical edition of 
the Masoretic Text emends the word from we-dal (ודל; and a poor man) to 
gadol (גדל; a great man).35
What then does it mean to show honour or respect to the poor, then? It is 
a phrase that is counterintuitive precisely because the poor are most often 
degraded and treated with disdain. A midrash in the Mekhilta of R. Simeon 
b. Yohai on this same verse (Exod 23:3) attempts to answer this question with 
typical rabbinic logic which eschews any possibility of error in the biblical 
texts:
Neither shall you honour a poor man (Ex 23:3) Can it mean that one should not honour 
the poor with money? Scripture says: “in his cause” – that he shall not favour the poor 
in law; that you shall not say this man is poor, this man is of a good family, I will pro-
nounce judgment in his favour and he will then be able to provide for himself honestly. 
For this it is said “neither shall you honour a poor man in his cause” and further on 
it is said “you shall not favour the person of the poor.” (Lev 19:15) (Epstein-Melamed 
pp. 214–15)
The midrash identifies the chief way that the poor are expected to be ‘hon-
oured’ in Jewish law – with money, by providing them with a livelihood. Be-
cause of this requirement, they cannot accept that the Torah would generally 
forbid people from honouring the poor; therefore, the midrash points out, the 
Torah is specific: although the poor must be honoured in general with the pro-
vision of material goods, in a legal case only one must put aside this obligation 
and not accord them this honour. Even though this line of reasoning is easy to 
follow, the midrash continues by providing a hypothetical scenario in which 
the poor is in fact honoured materially within the process of legal judgment: 
the judge could decide to rule in favour of the poor person if the other claim-
ant were wealthy, thereby providing a “good, honest living” for him. This pos-
sibility, according to the midrash, is why the Torah must explicitly command 
that a poor person not be “honoured” in court.
What is interesting about this commentary is that nowhere does it make the 
claim that “honouring” the poor man by forcing the rich man to provide for 
34 E. g., Is 2:10, 35:2; Ps 21:6, 145:5.
35 A parallel verse in Lev 19:15 makes this precise emendation: “you shall not lift of the face 
[fig. be partial to] the poor man, nor shall you honour (tehedar) the great [man].”
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him is a perversion or distortion of justice.36 Moreover, unlike in the Tosefta 
above, the word “charity” (tsedaqa) is never used for this judicial gesture that 
is offered to the poor man. In fact, the hypothetical case in the midrash actu-
ally has the judge thinking that a judgment in favour of the poor man – even 
if incorrect according to legal reasoning – provides him with an “honest” liv-
ing: the word used here is “be-neqi’ut” which literally means cleanliness or 
purity,37 and is used throughout the Hebrew Bible to mean legal innocence.38 
We might infer that there is a larger justice that is being served here in decid-
ing in favour of the poor man, and forcing the rich man to provide for him. It 
is not a gesture of pity or mercy but rather a way of distributing wealth fairly 
while keeping the poor man’s dignity intact.39 It is thus the principle of a more 
limited legal justice and the formal biblical requirement of the equal treatment 
of both litigants whether poor or rich, rather than anything inevitably neces-
sary about legal processes, that prohibits the judge from taking into consid-
eration the particular needs of the individual litigant and enacting a broader 
social justice in the courtroom.
Concerns about financial inequities are not the only ones which may tempt 
a judge away from adjudicating strictly according to the demands of statute 
and precedent; affect plays a role as well. The judge may himself feel things, or 
may intuit second-hand the emotional repercussions (and subsequent social 
fall-out) on the losing litigant, and may thus want to alter his legal rulings to 
achieve a better, and happier, result. In one midrash, the judge is afraid that 
the litigant against whom he rules will become violent and take revenge:
You shall not fear man. Lest you say: “I am afraid of so-and-so, lest he kill my children, 
or lest he set fire to my stacks of grain, or lest he uproot my planting.” Scripture says: 
“do not be fearful of man, for judgment is God’s.” So also Jehoshaphat said, “He said to 
the judges, consider what you do, for you judge not for man, but for the Lord” (2 Chron 
19:6) (Sifre Deut pisqa 17; Finkelstein p. 29)
In this case, the judge may very well have a legitimate fear of retribution, es-
pecially if we imagine courtrooms not as large, anonymous institutions but 
small tribunals whose decisions would ripple through small communities and 
villages. Rather than attempt to mitigate or respond to this fear, the midrash 
36 The same is true for the parallel versions in the Sifra on Leviticus (Qedoshim 2.4) and Sifre 
Deuteronomy (p. 17), which all use the phrase “be-neqi’ut,” and never cite biblical verses on 
the distortion or perversion of justice.
37 See Michael Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Palestinian Aramaic of the Byzantine Period 
(2nd ed.; Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2002), 360.
38 See, for example, Exod 23:7 and Ps 15:5.
39 This concept of preserving the dignity of the poor is elaborated by Gardner, Organized 
Charity, 139–56. That provision of the poor can be an aspect of justice, rather than charity, 
is shown in the rabbinic interpretation of the obligation to leave certain gleanings aside for 
the poor, understood as social justice rather than as charity: see G. E. Gardner, “Giving to 
the Poor in Early Rabbinic Judaism” (Ph. D. diss., Princeton University, 2009), 38–39.
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relegates such fear itself to the hypothetical, imagining that the judge can sim-
ply stop feeling afraid once he remembers his divine responsibility in the face 
of an all too human dread. It is possible that the midrash cites the verse from 
Chronicles to convey the added sense of the continuation of the verse (found 
in Tosefta Sanhedrin 1:9, discussed above). In this case, the judge might be 
exhorted to remember not only that he must aspire to divine standards in 
judging (and not give in to human fear), but also that “God is with [him] in 
giving judgment” – that God stands behind the judge as a kind of protective 
shield against petty retribution. Nevertheless, the midrash has once again, as 
above, created a hypothetical scenario with quite lasting rhetorical power – 
the phrase “lest he kill my children” not easily shaken off. Rather than dem-
onstrate that this fear can be mitigated, or argue that it is unwarranted, the 
midrash simply demands that it be quickly overcome, implicitly tolerating the 
further violence that can ensue as a result of strict legal justice.
Another approach to decision making based on fear of a violent aftermath is 
found again in Tosefta Sanhedrin chapter 1. Here the tosefta, in the context of 
the debate between legal justice and compromise, allows for one other possi-
bility aside from ignoring the issue: recusal. The scenario the tosefta describes 
is somewhat unclear because of disputed textual transmission, but each pos-
sible reconstruction of the text offers an intriguing hypothetical:
R. Judah b Laqish says: two who come before one for judgment, one strong and the 
other weak – before one has heard their claims, or if one has heard their claims and 
doesn’t know which way the case leans, one is permitted to say to them: “I will not be 
bound to you
 MS1 (Vienna): lest the strong one is found liable and thus the strong one becomes 
his enemy.”
 MS2 (Erfurt): lest the strong one weak one is found liable and thus the strong one 
pursues him.”
 First Printed Edition: lest the strong one is found liable and thus the strong one 
becomes my enemy.”
 Once one has heard their claims and knows which way the case leans, one is not 
permitted to say to them: “I will not bind myself to you.” And therefore it says: “do not 
be fearful of man, for judgment is God’s.” (Deut 1:17) (t. Sanh. 1:7; Zuckermandel p. 415)
In all the variants of this passage, the motivating factor in the judge recus-
ing himself is fear of eliciting further violence, instability, or disharmony by 
definitively rendering a verdict in a dispute between a strong man and a weak 
man.40 Precisely what the scenario is that the judge fears is what is not pre-
served clearly in this text. In the first manuscript’s scenario (as well as the 
one struck out by the second manuscript), the strong one is found liable, the 
weak litigant wins, and the strong one rather ominously is set at enmity with 
the weak one, thus increasing social disharmony as well as the likelihood of 
40 In this hypothetical, the disparity between “strong” and “weak” most likely applies to phys-
ical stature and / or the ability of one litigant to menace the other.
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the strong one wreaking vengeance at some point in the future. Here, fear 
combines with the theme of charity or generosity toward the vulnerable by 
constructing a case in which the judge is not only fearful of a bad outcome, but 
shows compassion for the weak litigant and fears for his suffering. In this case, 
a judge is permitted to withdraw rather than inadvertently sic the strongman 
on the more vulnerable litigant.
The second manuscript’s scenario differs slightly. In this case, the weak one 
is declared liable, but rather than making social relations easier, it sets up a 
situation in which the strong man, presumably in order to retrieve his owed 
settlement, “pursues” the weak man (we may imagine through mafia-like 
means). Once again, the judge here may recuse himself rather than foster fur-
ther injustice by apparently taking the side of the strong man in his thuggish 
pursuit of debt repayment.
Finally, the printed edition’s scenario is the one that hews most closely to 
the midrash in the Sifre discussed above. Here, the judge withdraws because 
he is afraid that in declaring the strong man liable, he either renders himself 
vulnerable to the strong man’s vengeance, or, more broadly, that he increases 
social disharmony by further disenchanting the strong man from the judge 
and judicial processes, i. e., peaceful forms of dispute resolution. In such a 
scenario, the strong man would be likely to rely on private vengeance instead 
of the courts.
In any of these hypotheticals, recusal – the tosefta’s remedy – is only a par-
tial solution.
The verb z-q-q used here to describe the relationship between the judge and 
the litigants is suggestive: a verb used to describe domestic cohabitation, and 
even in some conjugations the act of caring.41 The word choice is suggestive in 
the sense that the judge is not just performing a service or a public or sacred 
duty, but he is “binding” himself to the litigants – an act in which the judge 
appears to exceed his limited function as a nearly mechanical resolver of dis-
putes. He comes to see their characters and lives, in all their particularities, 
and thus he also comes to see their futures. The only way out of an anticipated 
harmful or injurious future, for the “weak” litigant or for himself, here, is to 
disengage.
However, this option only obtains when the matter is unclear. If the judge 
has an inkling as to the proper judgment in the case, he must declare it.42 
It appears that a judge may even inadvertently wind up binding himself to 
the litigants through his specialized knowledge of their situation; the tosefta 
again invokes the judge’s sacred duty to impose legal justice despite his fears 
or concerns, this time citing Deuteronomy rather than Chronicles. The court 
system must continue to operate even in spite of a judge’s reservations about 
41 See Jastrow (1926), p. 410, for examples.
42 The same criterion is applied, in the previous tosefta, to a judge advising the litigants to seek 
mediation or compromise.
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the problems that might ensue as a result of it – but the justice or social good it 
results in, despite the divine imperative to make it happen, is debatable.
Fear is not the only emotion with social consequences that might interfere 
with a judge’s rational, legal decision making – the rabbis also consider shame:
“Nor shall you honour a great man” (Lev 19:15). You shall not say, “he is rich and the 
son of great men – I will not put him to shame and see his shamefulness and the extent 
to which I shamed him.” Therefore, it is said, “you shall not honour a great man.” (Sifra 
Kedoshim 2:4)
The requirement not to defer to a rich or powerful man in a dispute is perhaps 
all too obvious. The midrashic commentaries, however, do not see it as a sim-
ple prohibition of cronyism or collusion with power. Instead, they presume 
that the judge has virtuous motives, thereby reinforcing the necessity of the 
explicit biblical prohibition.43 Generally, rabbinic law is sensitive to the gravity 
of publicly humiliating others; “shame” is included as one of the five primary 
damages in torts cases as outlined in Mishnah Baba Qama (8:1). According 
to the anonymous opinion of the mishnah there, a great man would be more 
susceptible to shame since the extent of the damage “follows one’s honour” (m. 
Bab. Qam. 8:6). The judge’s deference to the great man, therefore, is not seen as 
simple bias but rather the desire to avoid further harm and injury as a result of 
the judicial process itself. Again, despite these altruistic intentions, the rabbis 
read the Torah as demanding adherence to legal justice, rather than attempt-
ing to seek a solution that respects both significant ideals.
A parallel text in Sifre Deuteronomy attempts just that – but rather than be-
ing framed as a compromise solution, it is positioned as a hypothetical:
Another interpretation: “You shall hear the small and the great alike” (Deut 1:17). Lest 
you say, “how can I damage the reputation of this rich man because of one denar? I 
will clear him of liability, and when he leaves the courtroom I will say to him: Give it to 
him since you are liable.” Scripture says: “you shall hear the small and the great alike.” 
(Sifre Deut 17; Finkelstein p. 28)
In the hypothetical of the Sifre, justice is done on two counts: the “small” man 
collects the small amount of money he is owed by law (one denar), and the rich 
man’s dignity and honour remains intact. Everyone wins. The only value that 
has been sacrificed is equal treatment under the law, and the commitment to 
strict legal justice; nevertheless, these are the values of legal justice which the 
Torah will not sacrifice for the sake of perceived greater social goods.44
43 Rabbinic hermeneutics emphasize the omnisignificance of scripture; if a teaching is too 
obvious, the rabbis generally believe, it need not be stated explicitly in scripture. However, 
rabbinic midrash will often make this interpretive logic explicit, and they do not do that 
here. It is therefore not a necessary way of reading this text, and there may be other reasons 
why the rabbis fail to consider that the prohibition not to honour a great man does not refer 
simply to self-interested judicial bias in favour of the rich and powerful.
44 It is more difficult for us in the modern era to sympathize fully with the midrash’s hy-
pothetical here – in fact, strict legal justice in this case, precisely because it damages the 
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Finally, the midrash discusses a scenario in which a litigants’ shame might 
in fact be a desired outcome:
“You shall not pervert the judgment of the needy in his cause” (Ex 23:6) … If you have 
before you a wicked man and an upright man, do not say that since this man is wicked, 
I will turn judgment against him. Therefore, it is said, “You shall not pervert the judg-
ment of the needy in his cause” – one who is poor in good deeds. (Mekhilta Mishpatim 
Kaspa 20; Lauterbach pp. 472–73)
Here, as opposed to a situation in which the judge might desire to honour the 
litigant’s dignity, the judge is faced with the opposite dilemma: the litigant 
before him is known to be wicked, and therefore the judge appeals to a great-
er sense of justice in which a generally good man should be honoured and 
rewarded, while a generally wicked man should be shamed and punished.45 
Again, the judge is faced with a situation in which according to strict legal 
reasoning there may be one outcome, but according to a broader sense of jus-
tice and the values of society, there would be another. Once again, the midrash 
dismisses such broader considerations from the outset, presenting them as 
merely hypothetical; nevertheless, it has raised them and thus revealed the 
darker side of adherence to legal justice, in which legally “correct” decisions 
produce socially – and in this case morally – undesirable results.
reputation of the rich man, may seem preferable and more just. However, within rabbinic 
law there are many rules and legal exemptions provided to men of high status in order that 
they retain their dignity (again, see Gardner, Organized Charity, esp. 153–55 which dem-
onstrates that not shaming those who fell from riches into poverty was so important that 
the community charity fund was enlisted to restore such people back to precisely the status 
they maintained before, even if that meant providing them with horses and slaves). Mainte-
nance of the social order was seen as a real value for the rabbis, which makes this rejection 
of that value in the name of legal justice more radical than we might assume at first glance 
from a contemporary perspective, which often delights in humbling the rich and powerful.
45 In the parallel text in the Mekhilta of R. Simeon b. Yohai, the scenario is slightly different: 
“You shall not pervert the judgment of the needy” (Ex 23:6) Why do I need this? Has it not 
been stated already “you shall not pervert judgment” (Deut 16:19) either in favour of the 
poor or in favour of the rich? Why does it say “you shall not pervert judgment of the needy?” 
This is to include the case of a man who is poor in good deeds. For you should not say that 
since he is a wicked man he must be lying and this one must be telling the truth, and I will 
pervert the judgment against him. for this it is said “you shall not pervert judgment of the 
needy.” (Mekhilta of R. Simeon b. Yohai, 23:6; Epstein-Melamed p. 215)
  In this version, the dilemma that presents itself to the judge is not whether to proactively 
use his power in the situation to impose a justice greater than the case at hand by punishing 
the litigant’s overall wickedness, but rather whether to use character assessment as a basis 
for rendering judgments about the veracity of the litigant’s claims – a very different kind 
of predicament. According to this midrash, the Torah prohibits overall character assess-
ment from being used as an element in judging a case, even though such judgments were 
common in contemporary Roman legal thought and practice. See A. Bryen, “Martyrdom, 
Rhetoric, and the Politics of Procedure,” Classical Antiquity 33.2 (2014): 243–80, 249–50.
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Summary
In positing rejected hypotheticals, tannaitic literature does not depict gross 
miscarriages of justice or ways in which well-meaning judicial decisions can 
have subsequent deleterious effects on society. On the contrary, the rabbis 
time and again describe alternatives that appear to foster social harmony or 
mitigate systemic inequities, and we are shown judges who, to put it simply, 
care about people and society. The Tanaaim, however, dismiss this alternative 
in favour of circumscribed, rule-bound adjudication. I would therefore con-
clude that the Tanaaim of the midrash and the tosefta are well aware of the 
ways in which the universalized, one-size-fits-all legal justice they carve out 
for the courtroom falls short of justice as a broader ideal. This broader ideal is 
one that allows the poor to be supported with dignity, instead of with hand-
outs; one that allows the rich and powerful to pay back what is owed without 
any personal humiliation accompanying it; and one that does not allow people 
of reprehensible character who toe the line of the letter of the law to get away 
unscathed. It is despite this vision of a greater kind of justice that the tannaitic 
rabbis prescribe and construct a narrower concept of legal justice.
In other words, we might see here a rabbinic attempt to draw a conceptual 
line between legal justice and other social institutions; to delimit and thereby 
construct a distinct sphere of legal rationality – an imperfect arena that sim-
ply cannot, and will not, result in social justice or communal harmony.46 The 
tannaitic rabbis thus drew the boundaries around an institution in which the 
“rule of law” could operate almost automatically, with no space allotted for the 
human face of judicial discretion, even in instances in which it might improve 
the morality or justice of the outcome.
Opting for Strict Legal Justice: Putting the Rabbis in Context
The question that inevitably lingers, then, is why – why would the Tannaim 
construct a system which could not by definition live up to their social ideals? 
Why define the law so narrowly so as to exclude the real pursuit of justice? To 
some extent, the answer is obvious: with the rabbis living under Roman impe-
rial rule with its abundant propaganda promoting the ideology of the “rule of 
law,”47 as well as having inherited a Hellenistically-influenced tradition which 
itself was immersed in “rule of law” ideology,48 one would certainly be more 
surprised if the rabbis had abandoned this principle for one allowing a judge 
46 The Tannaim that uphold judicial compromise as a valuable and perhaps even preferable 
method of dispute resolution would not agree with this conclusion; however, the majority 
of voices in tannaitic literature, as well as the fact that discussion and veneration of com-
promise is omitted from Mishnah, reveal that the dominant trend is toward narrow, rule-
bound decision making.
47 See Ando, Imperial Ideology, 49–50.
48 See LeFebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah, 19 and Ando, Imperial Ideology, 47.
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freer use of his own wisdom, setting aside legal considerations to perform ju-
dicial magic along the lines of the biblical King Solomon.
Nevertheless, the rabbinic scrupulousness regarding judicial fidelity to 
strict, rule-bound decision making does not correlate easily with Roman “rule 
of law” platitudes or practice. Alongside fidelity to statutes and precedent, 
Roman judges were expected to both possess and deploy personal virtues in 
the process of making decisions, qualities such as fairness (aequitas), mercy 
(misericordia), and even humanity (humanitas).49 It is precisely qualities like 
these – or indeed wisdom (prudentia), which has a long and venerable bibli-
cal tradition – that the rabbis eject from legal decision making. I therefore 
would like to argue that the rabbis’ negotiation with Rome here is not simple 
mimicry or simple resistance (or even a little bit of both), but rather an inde-
pendent wrestling with the inherent difficulties posed by what is by then a 
hybrid Hellenistic-Roman-Jewish political concept of “rule of law,” from the 
subject position of colonized provincials. In short, I suggest that the tannaitic 
rabbis dealt with the age-old dilemma in “rule of law” philosophy – that often 
rule-bound formalism does not produce justice and that often justice-guided 
discretion does not adhere enough to statute and precedent – by erring on 
the side of caution; and that they did so because from their subject position 
as the governed rather than the governors, the power of rule-bound systems 
was preferable to the power of unchecked individuals in positions of authority.
First, however, we must consider various other explanatory schemes that 
scholars have offered to make sense of tannaitic tendencies toward legal jus-
tice. Each explanation offers part of the story toward a more holistic picture of 
a dominant early rabbinic philosophy of the rule of law and judicial decision 
making, but none explains it fully.
Hanina Ben-Menahem argues that the rabbis generally, throughout post-
tannaitic rabbinic literature, strive for a justice that transcends mere adher-
ence to rules.50 He therefore sees tannaitic literature as an anomaly, as “ex-
tremist” in its insistence on “strict enforcement of the law.”51 He concludes that 
the Tannaim thought this way because their work was a product of the study 
49 See C. F. Noreña, Imperial Ideals in the Roman West: Representation, Circulation, Power 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 64.
50 This view reflects the scholarly consensus. However, Deborah Barer’s recent dissertation ar-
gues that again in the late redaction layer of the Babylonian Talmud, the stammaim presume 
a stance that requires rabbinic decision making to be rule-bound rather than discretionary. 
According to Barer, they do so because they do not wish to entrust fallible human adjudica-
tors with the divine law. Why the amoraic rabbis, both in Palestine and Babylonia, seem 
much more comfortable with discretionary decisions that veer from statute and precedent 
is a question that remains open. See D. Barer, “A Judge with No Courtroom: Law, Ethics and 
the Rabbinic Idea of Lifnim Mi-Shurat Ha-Din” (Ph. D. diss., University of Virginia, 2016).
51 Ben-Menahem, Judicial Deviation, 122. Kirschenbaum simply explains this away by claim-
ing it is not actually the case given later Jewish law (Kirschenbaum, Equity in Jewish Law, 
111–12), but Ben Menahem shows – and this work confirms – that the tannaitic rabbis did 
indeed continually opt for strict legal formalism in judicial decision making.
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hall, rather than experience in real adjudication – hypothetical rather than 
practical. He writes:
The objection to the employment of extra-legal considerations embodied in the 
Midreshei Halakhah should be regarded as an expression of an ideal goal, the practical 
weight of which should not be overestimated. Ideal goals serve as directive principles. 
They guide but do not bind those to whom they are addressed, and they indicate cer-
tain tendencies without excluding dissenting opinions.52
While Ben-Menahem here correctly recognizes that tannaitic literature is 
both largely theoretical rather than a reflection of actual practice as well as 
interested in expressing ideals or even a kind of political philosophy, there is 
no reason to assume that the tannaitic rabbis in any way intended for their 
“opinions” to be read as non-binding, especially as many of them are directly 
linked to biblical commandments. Moreover, it is unclear to me what Ben-
Menahem means to convey by stating that strict, rule-bound decision making 
is the “ideal goal” of the Tannaim, considering the myriad of ways in which 
the Tanaaim clearly do not position limited legal justice as an ideal, but rather 
as an uncompromising requirement of the Torah and / or the legal system they 
create. Therefore, while Ben-Menahem correctly identifies the mode of tan-
naitic literature (theoretical rather than practical), this in and of itself does not 
do enough to account for their somewhat peculiar adherence to rule-based 
adjudication.
While not commenting directly on judges or the hermeneutics of legal jus-
tice, Naftali Cohn, drawing on Beth Berkowitz (both of whom draw on Homi 
Bhaba),53 sees the tannaitic rabbis’ juridical practice as mimicking Roman, 
legal culture. The rabbis do this as a kind of appropriation of power for them-
selves, and thus resistance to Roman power. By “fashion[ing] themselves as ju-
rists … of Judaean ritual law, the rabbis are imagining themselves in a Roman 
mold, but they are also asserting the primacy of their ancestral tradition.”54 In 
the case of methods of adjudication, we might add to this that the rabbis imag-
ine themselves as judging “in the Roman mold,” but resist dominant modes of 
Roman judging by refusing the latitude Roman judges allocate to themselves, 
in a sense beating the Romans at their own game – outdoing them in their 
adherence to what is, after all, a Roman imperial ideal: the rule of law.
There is a lot to recommend this way of seeing early rabbinic adjudication, 
as both an internalization and repudiation of Rome; and in a sense, I certainly 
accept it as a partial explanation of this rabbinic phenomenon, even if it occurs 
at an unconscious level, as most ideological operations do.55 But I do not think 
52 Ben-Menahem, Judicial Deviation, 123.
53 N. S. Cohn, The Memory of the Temple and the Making of the Rabbis (Philadelphia: Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 160 n. 93 and B. A. Berkowitz, Execution and Invention: 
Death Penalty Discourse in Early Rabbinic and Christian Cultures (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2006), 161.
54 Cohn, Memory of the Temple, 17, 37.
55 Ando cites Bourdieu and Habermas to make this point (Imperial Ideology, 21–22).
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it is the whole story, particularly because as opposed to some of the texts that 
Cohn and Berkowitz discuss, there is no explicit or implicit engagement with 
Rome, or “the Kingdom,” in these texts on judging. The rabbis here do not 
seem to be explicitly addressing the question of Roman dominance; instead, 
they seem to be entirely concerned with the very questions they raise: what is 
the best mode of judging? What kind of adjudication leads to social harmony 
and justice? And, finally, how are judges obligated to make decisions?
I would like to suggest that as the tannaitic rabbis address these “internal” 
questions of rabbinic legal theory, we should also be cognizant of the Roman, 
historical context from which they cannot be extricated. What is likely is that 
this context was not really Greek or Roman theoretical writing about politi-
cal philosophy, but the provincial experience of Roman judging. According 
to ancient historians, Roman provincials were quite litigious.56 Legal activity 
was widespread in the Roman East, with many legal papyri having been dis-
covered among the private estates of provincial families.57 It is fair to conclude, 
therefore, that the tannaitic rabbis had familiarity with Roman courts and Ro-
man methods of judgment. As Amram Tropper puts it, “The presence of Ro-
man legal jurisdiction and Greek-speaking lawyers in the Near East indicates 
that the fundamentals of Roman law were probably well known throughout 
the Graeco-Roman environment in Palestine.”58
According to Clifford Ando, the proliferation of legal documents in the 
Eastern Roman provinces is not simply a coincidence; provincials living in 
the Roman East turned to and relied on the law for a reason.
[W]e can … see in surviving documentary texts the profound impression left by the 
government’s claim to rationality: residents demonstrated their faith in the system 
when they played by its rules and especially when they attempted to exploit them. 
The survival of private copies of official documents, as of personal archives, testifies 
to a deep-seated trend. … Individuals kept such documents because they had faith 
in the rationality of Roman administration. They believed that it would abide by its 
established rules, whether they liked those rules or not. … The private collections of 
documents bore fruit in the remarkable array of surviving petitions that cite such 
precedents in formulating their own case.59
In other words, Ando argues not only as we saw above that the Roman impe-
rial government created the impression that the “rule of law” was important 
to them (their “claim to rationality”), but that the provincials for the most part 
accepted this imperial claim and attempted to hold them to their own stan-
dards by collecting precedent and presenting rational, legal arguments before 
Roman officials. To the extent that we can tell, this is true of Jewish provincials 
as well. A statement in Mishnah Avot, usually understood as referring to Ro-
56 Ando, Imperial Ideology, 375.
57 Ando, Imperial Ideology, 380.
58 A. Tropper, Wisdom, Politics, and Historiography: Tractate Avot in the Context of the Grae-
co-Roman Near East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 191.
59 Ando, Imperial Ideology, 376, 380
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man principles of law and order,60 may reflect this accommodationist stance 
among Jews: “R. Hannah deputy of the priests said: Pray for the welfare of the 
kingdom since, but for the fear of it, each one of us would have swallowed his 
neighbour alive” (m. Avot 3:2, trans. Tropper p. 260). And, according to Ando, 
Jewish provincials did not just fear the Roman government, but also engaged 
with it: “the Greek texts in the dossier of Babatha reveal a woman eager to ex-
ploit Roman law and Roman authorities in order to settle a host of longstand-
ing legal disputes …”61
Therefore, Roman law was not only known to provincials, but it was em-
braced by them, not only to gain advantage and settle disputes with neigh-
bours, but as a kind of general mode of empowerment. Again, Ando writes: 
“Provincials absorbed and iterated those ideas that they wished their over-
lords to endorse, embody, and express. Above all, provincials exploited ideo-
logical tropes that gave them leverage over civiles principes.”62 Pushing this 
argument further, Ari Bryen takes seriously how defenceless non-Roman pro-
vincials would have been before Roman governors and views legal practice as 
perhaps the only relatively effective mode of empowerment for provincials. He 
reminds us that:
[t]he governor was the total authority in the provinces in dealings with individuals 
who were not Roman citizens. … Provincials worried about the possibility that the 
governor would shed his trappings of civility and indulge what they imagined to be his 
innate tendency toward improvised street violence.63
There was nothing that provincials could do to change those asymmetrical 
dynamics. However, they might find respite from it in the law:
The courtroom was a sacred space, in the sense that it was the site of a particular set 
of ritualized interactions. … [T]he governor in the courtroom would be obligated to 
sit passively, to listen to claims, and to interrogate (that is, to ask and be answered). As 
such, the courtroom was a space in which the power dynamics of the everyday were 
temporarily suspended, negotiated, and potentially reconfigured.
 … As such, the law contained a particular form of power: the power to force impe-
rial authorities to bring themselves or others into conformity with provincial desires, 
and the power to force officials to change their behavior or to enforce a change in the 
behavior of another party. However, these moments of power could only be produced 
in the courtroom, and only accessed in it.64
Indeed, Bryen, following Ando, sees the provincial population’s ability to ac-
cess written statute and precedent as the very means by which ordinary sub-
60 See, e. g., B. S. Jackson, “Jewish Approaches to Law (Religious and Secular),” Law & Justice – 
The Christian Law Review 164 (2010): 63–74, 63 n. 1.
61 Ando, Imperial Ideology, 381.
62 Ando, Imperial Ideology, 47, emphasis mine.
63 A. Z. Bryen, “Judging Empire: Courts And Culture in Rome’s Eastern Provinces,” in Law 
and History Review 30, no. 3 (August 2012): 771–811, 781–82.
64 Bryen, “Judging,” 799–800, 807.
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jects could get admittedly limited leverage over a Roman governor. It was pre-
cisely the Roman commitment to “play by the rules” that bound their hands 
in the courtroom and allowed provincials a modicum of power in relation to 
them:
The eastern provincials relied on a concept of law which was something substantially 
new in Roman legal thinking concerning the governing of subjugated peoples. This vi-
sion of the law was founded on the idea that there existed a disembodied world of rules 
that transcended even the emperor himself, and that these rules could be accessed 
by the skillful manipulation of authoritative legal texts in the context of courtroom 
encounters structured by proper procedure.65
It was only by tapping into this textual universe that subjugated provincials 
could seize a moment in which they could, before the Roman government, 
“articulate their views of the ways the world should be working.”66
Therefore, I submit that the idea that a judge in a courtroom would be 
bound by statute and precedent, writings which are in some manner public 
and predate the event of adjudication, would have been an attractive, if not 
necessary ideal for (especially non-citizen) provincials living under Roman 
rule. It was a significant safeguard against arbitrary power, and perhaps the 
only predictable means of obligating a provincial governor to respond to an 
imperative greater than the powers of his local office. Law could be seen as 
a tool which would give provincials a voice in Roman affairs, and often give 
them the upper hand.
In imagining the role of rabbinic judges in their own writings, the Tanaaim 
are not particularly concerned about reining in excesses of judicial power. In 
fact, likely imagining themselves or their colleagues serving as judges (which 
they seem to have done from time to time),67 it is clear from the texts above 
that the early rabbis only thought the best of potential judges, positing that 
they would be motivated by ideals of justice, generosity and caring. In spite 
of this, these same rabbis were also most likely accustomed to thinking of 
the courtroom as a “ritualized space” in which the power of legal statute and 
precedent, of a “disembodied world of rules,” could topple the mightiest of 
governors by neutralizing his authority to act arbitrarily. The power of such 
an imaginary about the force of law could easily overwhelm a more pragmatic 
assessment of judicial discretion in instances that could lead to greater justice 
or social harmony. The Tanaaim that did champion the value of compromise, 
or pesharah, were perhaps able to recognize the limits of such a formal system 
of “disembodied” legal justice: that while it may allow for a temporary sub-
jugation of an individual’s official authority under the binding power of legal 
imperatives, it does not produce outcomes that create a better society or com-
65 Bryen, “Judging,” 776, emphasis mine.
66 Bryen, “Judging,” 802.
67 See H. Lapin, Rabbis as Romans: The Rabbinic Movement in Palestine, 100–400 CE (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012), chapter 4: “Provincial Arbitration.”
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munity. Nevertheless, the prevailing view in tannaitic texts in favour of rule-
bound adjudication is consistent with the enthusiastic pursuit of rule-bound 
justice among eastern provincials in Roman courts.
Conclusion
I have shown that tannaitic literature implies an awareness that strict legal 
justice does not necessarily lead to greater social good. Despite this, on the 
whole, the tannaitic rabbis refrain from giving the judge discretion to take 
into consideration the specific needs of individual litigant or other, more gen-
eral, social needs or ideals; the judge, as stated again and again in tannaitic 
literature, is required to follow the rationality of legal statute and adjudicate 
accordingly. I have accounted for this somewhat strange quirk of tannaitic 
legal thought by arguing that the rabbis did not only subscribe to the general 
ideals of “rule of law” that the Romans, and Greeks before them, promoted 
in the provinces, but that their position as disempowered, largely non-citizen 
provincials would have encouraged them to read that ideology as formally as 
possible, because doing so allowed the courtroom to become a place where 
well-informed litigants could wield both real and discursive power over the 
Roman government. Such an understanding of what the “rule of law” means 
in practice, in the courtroom, could certainly have held sway when the rabbis 
imagined their own ideal courtrooms, and the procedures that judges would 
have to adhere to.
Such a reading of tannaitic legal thought requires us to suspend precon-
ceived notions that legal systems of dispute resolution are inherently or inevi-
tably formal, rule-bound, and universal. It also leads us toward the acknowl-
edgment that the justice of the courtroom is not just amorphously synonymous 
with “justice” writ large: mishpat is distinct from tsedaqa and shalom and no 
one term or concept covers all of these social values for the rabbis. We find 
the Tanaaim not simply responding to the demands of legal justice, but con-
structing and re-inscribing, at various different points, a definition of “law” in 
opposition to another value. Each time they do so, they imbue legal discourse 
with power over other modes of dispute resolution, community building, or 
meaning making – for good or for ill.
